Abstract-A revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) provides an efficient revocation method in IBE that a trusted authority periodically broadcasts an update key for nonrevoked users and a user can decrypt a ciphertext if he is not revoked in the update key. Boldyreva, Goyal, and Kumar (CCS 2008) defined RIBE and proposed an RIBE scheme that uses a treebased revocation encryption scheme to revoke users' private keys. In this paper, we devise a new technique for RIBE and propose RIBE schemes with a constant number of private key elements. We achieve the following results. We first devise a new technique for RIBE that combines a hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme and a public-key broadcast encryption (PKBE) scheme using multilinear maps. In contrast to the previous technique for RIBE, our technique uses a PKBE scheme in bilinear maps for revocation to achieve short private keys and update keys. Following our new technique for RIBE, we propose an RIBE scheme in three-leveled multilinear maps that combines the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen (EUROCRYPT 2004) and the PKBE scheme of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters (CRYPTO 2005). The private key and update key of our scheme possess a constant number of group elements. Next, we propose another RIBE scheme with reduced public parameters and short keys by combining the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen and the PKBE scheme of Boneh, Waters, and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2014), which uses multilinear maps. Compared with our first RIBE scheme, our second RIBE scheme requires high-leveled multilinear maps.
I. INTRODUCTION

P
ROVIDING an efficient revocation mechanism in cryptosystems for a large number of users is very important since it can prevent a user from accessing sensitive data in cryptosystems by revoking the private key of a user when the private key is revealed or expired. In public-key encryption (PKE), which employs the public-key infrastructure (PKI), there are many studies that deal with the certificate revocation problem [1] - [4] . In identity-based encryption (IBE) [5] , [6] , a natural approach for this revocation problem is that a trusted authority periodically renews a user's private key for his identity at a current time period and then a sender creates a ciphertext for both a receiver identity and a current time period. However, this approach has some problems: the trusted authority should always be online to renew the user's private keys, users should always renew their private keys regardless of whether their private keys are revoked, and a secure channel should be established between the trusted authority and a user to transmit a renewed private key.
An IBE scheme that provides an efficient revocation mechanism (RIBE) was proposed by Boldyreva et al. [7] . In RIBE, each user receives a (long-term) private key SK I D for his identity I D from a trusted authority, and the trusted authority periodically broadcasts an update key U K T ,R at a current time T by including a revoked identity set R. If a user has a private key SK I D that is not revoked by the revoked identity set R of the update key U K T ,R , then he can derive his (short-term) decryption key DK I D,T from his private key SK I D and the update key U K T ,R . This decryption key can be used to decrypt a ciphertext CT I D,T for a receiver identity I D and a time period T. The main advantage of this approach is that the trusted authority can be offline because the authority only need to broadcast the update key periodically. To build an RIBE scheme, Boldyreva et al. [7] used the tree-based revocation encryption scheme of Naor et al. [8] for revocation and the ABE scheme of Sahai and Waters [9] for encryption of an identity and a time period. Other RIBE schemes also follow this design approach that uses the tree-based revocation encryption scheme for revocation [10] - [12] . This design approach, however, has an inherent limitation in that the number of private key elements and update key elements cannot be constant since a private key is associated with path nodes in a tree and an update key is associated with covering nodes in the tree [8] . Therefore, in this paper, we ask the following questions about RIBE: "Can we build an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements? Can we devise a new technique for efficient RIBE that is different from the previous approach?"
A. Our Results
In this work, we give affirmative answers to both of the above questions. That is, we first devise a new technique for RIBE that is quite different from the previous technique, and we propose two RIBE schemes with a constant number of private key elements. The following is our results:
New Techniques for Revocable IBE: Previous RIBE schemes [7] , [10] , [11] use IBE (or ABE) schemes for the main encryption functionality and the tree-based revocation encryption of Naor et al. [8] for the revocation functionality. As mentioned, the inherent limitation of the tree-based revocation encryption scheme is that the number of private key elements and update key elements cannot be constant. To achieve an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements, we observe that PKBE schemes [13] , [14] in bilinear groups can be directly used for delivering a partial key of IBE to non-revoked users because these broadcast schemes have short private keys and short ciphertexts. That is, the private key SK I D,T of a two-level HIBE scheme with an identity I D and a time period T is divided into two partial keys SK I D and SK T . A user's actual key consists of SK I D and the private key of PKBE, and a trusted authority broadcasts an update key U K T ,R that is the encryption of SK T , which excludes revoked users R. If the user is not revoked, then he can derive SK I D,T of HIBE combining SK I D in his actual key and SK T in U K T ,R . However, this simple RIBE scheme is vulnerable under a simple attack-that is, if an adversary corrupts a user I D at time T , then he can obtain a partial key SK I D and a PKBE key for I D. The adversary then can decrypt a previous ciphertext CT I D,T such that T < T by obtaining a partial key SK T from U K T ,R since the PKBE key that was obtained at time T can still be applied to decrypt U K T ,R at time T. To overcome the simple attack, we set the private key SK of RIBE by binding the private key of HIBE and the private key of PKBE, and set the update key U K of RIBE by binding the private key of HIBE and the ciphertext of PKBE. However, this RIBE scheme possesses another problem-a decryption key derived from a private key and an update key by performing a pairing operation cannot be used to decrypt a ciphertext since the decryption key is the result of the pairing operation in bilinear groups. To solve this new problem, we use multilinear maps that were recently proposed by Garg et al. [15] . The detailed techniques are discussed below in this section.
RIBE With Shorter Private Keys and Update Keys:
We first propose an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements by applying our new technique for RIBE on the three-leveled multilinear maps. For a concrete RIBE construction, we use the PKBE scheme of Boneh, Gentry, and Waters (BGW-PKBE) [13] for revocation and the HIBE scheme of Boneh et al. (BB-HIBE) [16] for encryption of an identity I D and a time T. The public parameters, the private key, the update key, and the ciphertext of our RIBE scheme just consist of O(N + λ), O(1), O (1) , and O(1) group elements, respectively. As far as we know, our RIBE scheme is the first one that achieves a constant number of private key elements and update key elements. To prove the security of our RIBE scheme, we introduce a new complexity assumption called the Multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (MDHE) assumption that is a natural multilinear version of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption of Boneh et al. [13] . We prove the security of our scheme in the selective revocation list model, where an adversary should initially submit a challenge identity, a challenge time, and the revoked set of identities at the challenge time.
RIBE With Reduced Pubic Parameters:
The number of group elements in the public parameters of our first RIBE scheme is proportional to the maximum number of users. To overcome this problem, we propose another RIBE scheme with reduced public parameters on O(log N)-leveled multilinear maps by employing the PKBE scheme of Boneh et al. (BWZ-PKBE) [17] . The interesting feature of the BWZ-PKBE scheme is that the public key just consists of O(log N) group elements whereas the public key of the BGW-PKBE scheme [13] consists of O(N) group elements. Additionally, the BWZ-PKBE scheme has a similar structure to the BGW-PKBE scheme except that it uses O(log N)-leveled multilinear maps. Because of this structural similarity, we can build an RIBE scheme based on the BWZ-PKBE scheme by following our new technique for RIBE. We prove the security of our second RIBE scheme in the selective revocation list model by using the compressed MDHE (cMDHE) assumption. Although the number of group elements in public parameters is reduced, our second RIBE scheme is not a truly identity-based one since the maximum size of the receiver set is restricted to being polynomial in the BWZ-PKBE scheme. A detailed comparison between our RIBE schemes and other RIBE schemes is given in Table I . Note that the bit size of private keys and update keys in our RIBE schemes is not constant since the bit size of group elements in leveled multilinear maps is not constant [32] .
B. Our Technique
To devise an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements, we use the BGW-PKBE scheme [13] for revocation instead of using the revocation encryption of Naor et al. [8] . The revocation encryption of the NNL framework mainly uses a tree for broadcasting, and it is hard to provide a constant number of RIBE private key elements since the private key of the NNL framework is associated with path nodes in the tree and the update key is associated with subset covering nodes in the tree [8] . The BGW-PKBE scheme, by contrast, can provide a constant number of RIBE private key elements since the PKBE scheme has a constant number of private key elements.
For our RIBE construction, we use the BGW-PKBE scheme [13] for revocation and the two-level HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [16] for encryption of an identity I D and a time period T. As mentioned before, the simple approach is vulnerable under a simple attack. To address this problem, we first set the RIBE private key as 
which is 
However, there is a major problem with this idea. That is, a session key that is derived from the ciphertext and the private key of PKBE in bilinear groups is an element in G T , and this session key cannot be used for pairing in bilinear groups. This means that the RIBE decryption key DK I D,T , which is related with the session key of PKBE, cannot be used to decrypt a RIBE ciphertext CT I D,T since the pairing operation can no longer be applicable. To address this problem, we use three-leveled multilinear maps [15] . Note that bilinear maps correspond to two-leveled multilinear maps. In our RIBE scheme, which uses three-leveled multilinear maps, a private key SK I D is in G 1 , an update key U K T ,R is in G 1 , a decryption key DK I D,T is in G 2 , and a ciphertext CT I D,T is in G 1 . The ciphertext CT I D,T in G 1 and the decryption key DK I D,T in G 2 can be used to derive a session key by using a bilinear map e 1,2 (−, −), which is additionally provided by three-leveled multilinear maps. Therefore, we can build an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements from three-leveled multilinear maps. This technique also applies to the BWZ-PKBE scheme [17] .
C. Related Work
Identity-Based Encryption and Its Extensions: IBE, introduced by Shamir [5] , can solve the key management problem of PKE since it uses an identity string as a public key instead of using a random value. The first IBE scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [6] by using bilinear groups, and many other IBE schemes have been proposed in bilinear maps [16] , [19] . Another importance of IBE is that it has many surprising extensions such as hierarchical IBE (HIBE), attribute-based encryption (ABE), predicate encryption (PE), and functional encryption (FE). HIBE was introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [20] and it additionally provides private key delegation functionality [16] , [21] . ABE was introduced by Sahai and Waters [9] and it can provide access controls on ciphertexts by associating a ciphertext with attributes and a private key with a policy [22] . PE can provide searches on encrypted data by hiding attributes in ciphertexts [23] . Recently, the concept of FE, which includes all the extensions of IBE was introduced by Boneh et al. [24] , and it was shown that FE schemes for general circuits can be constructed [25] .
Revocation in IBE: As mentioned, providing an efficient revocation mechanism that can revoke a user whose private key is revealed is a very important issue in cryptosystems. In PKE, which employs the public-key infrastructure (PKI), the certificate revocation problem was widely studied [1] - [4] . In IBE, there are some works that deal with the key revocation problem [6] , [7] , [10] , [11] , [26] . We can categorize the revocation methods for IBE in the following two ways. In the first revocation method, a trusted authority periodically broadcasts a revoked user set R, and a sender creates a ciphertext by additionally including a receiver set S that excludes the revoked user set R [26] . That is, this method conceptually combines an IBE scheme with a PKBE scheme. Though this method is simple to construct and does not require a user to update his private key, the sender should check the validity of the revoked list and the sender has the responsibility for the revocation. Ideally, the sender should proceed as in any IBE scheme and encrypt a message without worrying about potential revoked users.
With the second revocation method, a sender creates a ciphertext for a receiver identity I D and a time T, and a receiver periodically updates his private key on a time T from a trusted authority if he is not revoked at the time T. That is, this method can revoke a user by preventing the user from obtaining his key components from the authority.
Boneh and Franklin [6] proposed a revocable IBE scheme by representing a user's identity as I D T with a user periodically receiving his private key at a time T by communicating with the authority. However, this RIBE scheme is impractical for a large number of users since all users should be connected to the authority to receive their private keys. To improve the efficiency of RIBE, Boldyreva et al. [7] proposed a new RIBE scheme, in which a trusted authority periodically broadcasts an update key for a time T and non-revoked users by using the revocation encryption of Naor et al. [8] . After that, many other RIBE schemes were proposed by following this design principle [10] - [12] , [18] . The key revocation is also an important issue in ABE. Sahai et al. [27] proposed a revocable-storage ABE (RS-ABE) scheme for cloud storage by extending the idea of RIBE schemes, and Lee et al. [28] proposed an improved RS-ABE scheme and a revocable-storage PE scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this subsection, we first define revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) and its security model, and then we review multilinear maps and complexity assumptions for our RIBE schemes.
A. Revocable Identity-Based Encryption
Revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) is an extension of identity-based encryption (IBE) in that a user with an identity I D can be revoked later if his credential is expired [7] . In RIBE, each user receives his (long-term) private key that is associated with an identity I D from a key generation center. After that, the key generation center periodically broadcasts an update key for the non-revoked set of users where the update key is associated with a time T and a revoked set R. If a user is not revoked in the update key, then he can derive his (short-term) decryption key for his identity I D and the current time T from the private key and the update key. Using the decryption key for I D and T, the user can decrypt a ciphertext for a receiver identity I D c and a time T c if I D = I D c and T = T c . The following is the syntax of RIBE.
Definition 2.1 (Revocable IBE):
A revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme that is associated with the identity space I, the time space T , and the message space M, consists of seven algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
• Setup (1 λ , N): The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and the maximum number of users N. It outputs a master key M K, an (empty) revocation list RL, a state ST, and public parameters P P.
• GenKey (I D, M K, ST, P P):
The private key generation algorithm takes as input an identity I D ∈ I, the master key M K, the state ST, and public parameters P P.
It outputs a private key SK I D for I D and an updated state ST. • UpdateKey (T, RL, M K, ST, P P):
The update key generation algorithm takes as input an update time T ∈ T , the revocation list RL, the master key M K, the state ST, and the public parameters P P. It outputs an update key U K T ,R for T and R where R is a revoked identity set at the time T. 
D, U K T ,R generated by UpdateKey(T, RL, M K, ST, P P) for any T and RL, CT I D c ,T c generated by Encrypt(I D c , T c , M, P P) for any I D c , T c , and M, it is required that
with all but negligible probability.
=⊥ with all but negligible probability. The security property of RIBE was formally defined by Boldyreva et al. [7] . Recently Seo and Emura [11] refined the security model of RIBE by considering decryption key exposure attacks. In this paper, we consider the selective revocation list security model of the refined security model. In the selective revocation list security game, an adversary initially submits a challenge identity I D * , a challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * at the time T * , and then he can adaptively request private key, update key, and decryption key queries with restrictions. In the challenge step, the adversary submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 , and then he receives a challenge ciphertext CT * that is an encryption of M * b where b is a random coin used to create the ciphertext. The adversary may continue to request private key, update key, and decryption key queries. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess for the random coin b. If the queries of the adversary satisfy the non-trivial conditions and the guess is correct, then the adversary wins the game. The following is the formal definition of the selective revocation security.
Definition 2.2 (Selective Revocation List Security):
The selective revocation list security property of RIBE under chosen plaintext attacks is defined in terms of the following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT The revocation query for a time T cannot be queried if the update key query for the time T was already requested. Note that A is allowed to request the update key query and the revocation query in non-decreasing order of time, and an update key U K T ,R implicitly includes a revoked identity set R derived from RL. 4) Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 ∈ M with equal length. C flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the challenge ciphertext CT * to A by running Encrypt(I D * , T * , M * b , P P).
5) Phase 2:
A may continue to request a polynomial number of private keys, update keys, and decryption keys subject to the same restrictions as before. 6) Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}, and wins the game if b = b . The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over all the randomness of the experiment. A RIBE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Remark 2.3:
The selective revocation list security model is weaker than the well-known selective security model since the adversary additionally submits the revoked identity set R * in advance. However, this weaker model was already introduced by Boldyreva et al. [7] to prove the security of their revocable ABE scheme. 1 
B. Leveled Multilinear Maps
We define generic leveled multilinear maps that are the leveled version of the cryptographic multilinear maps introduced by Boneh and Silverberg [30] . We follow the definition of Garg et al. [15] .
Definition 2.4 (Leveled Multilinear Maps):
We assume the existence of a group generator G, which takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer k. Let G = (G 1 , . . . , G k ) be a sequence of groups of large prime order p > 2 λ . In addition, we let g i be a canonical generator of G i respectively. We assume the existence of a set of bilinear maps {e i, j :
• Bilinearity: The map e i, j satisfies the following relation:
each valid i, j . We say that G is a multilinear group if the group operations in G as well as all bilinear maps are efficiently computable. We often omit the subscripts of e i, j and just write e.
C. Complexity Assumptions
We introduce new complexity assumptions in multilinear maps. The first assumption is the multilinear version of the well-known Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption of Boneh et al. [13] .
and Z are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, c 1 
For the security proof of our first RIBE scheme, we use (3, N)-MDHE assumption that is a specific instance of the MDHE assumption since the scheme is built on the three-leveled multilinear maps.
Assumption 2.6 [(3, N)-MDHE]:
Let ( p, G, e 1,1 , e 1,2 , e 2,1 ) be the description of a three-leveled multilinear group of order p. Let g i be a generator of G i . The decisional (3, N)-MDHE assumption is that if the challenge tuple
from a random element Z = Z 1 ∈ G 3 1 Boldyreva et al. initially claimed that their revocable ABE scheme is secure in the selective model [7] , but they later corrected it as their revocable ABE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model [29] .
with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage of A is defined as Adv
where the probability is taken over random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z p .
The second assumption in multilinear maps is the compressed version of the BDHE assumption. Boneh et al. [17] introduced this compressed assumption to prove the security of their broadcast encryption in multilinear maps. 2 We slightly modify their assumption for our second RIBE scheme by adding additional one element.
2n+l−2 from a random element Z = Z 1 ∈ G 2n+l−2 with more than a negligible advantage.
The advantage of A is defined as Adv
We discuss the difficulty of our new assumptions in generic multilinear groups in Appendix A.
III. REVOCABLE IBE WITH SHORTER KEYS
In this section, we propose an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements from three-leveled multilinear maps and prove its selective revocation list security. Essentially, we use the broadcast encryption of Boneh et al. [13] , which uses bilinear maps.
A. Construction
Let N = {1, . . . , N} where N is the (polynomial) number of users. Let I = {0, 1} l 1 be the identity space and T = {0, 1} l 2 be the time space where l 1 = 2λ and l 2 = λ for a security parameter λ. Our RIBE scheme from three-leveled multilinear maps is described as follows:
RIBE.Setup (1 λ , N) : This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and the maximum number N of users. It generates a 3-leveled multilinear group
respectively. Let P P M L M be the description of the multilinear group with generators.
1) It selects random elements
Note that we can obtain f 2 and h 2 from f 1 and h 1 by performing pairing operations. We define 
It outputs a master key M K = (α, β, γ ), an empty revocation list RL, an empty state ST, and public parameters P P as
.
RIBE.GenKey(I D, M K, ST, P P):
This algorithm takes as input an identity I D ∈ I, the master key M K, the state ST, and public parameters P P.
1 
RIBE.UpdateKey(T, RL, M K, ST, P P):
This algorithm takes as input a time T, the revocation list RL, the master key M K, the state ST, and public parameters P P.
1) It first defines the revoked set R of user identities at the time T from RL. That is, if there exists
It defines the revoked index set R I ⊆ N of the revoked identity set R by using the state ST since ST contains (I D, d ). It also defines the non-revoked index set S I = N \ R I . 2) Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and outputs an update key U K T ,R by implicitly including T, R, and the revoked index set R I as
RIBE.DeriveKey(S K I D , U K T ,R , P P): This algorithm takes as input a private key
for a time T and a revoked set R of identities, and the public parameters P P. If I D ∈ R, then it outputs ⊥ since the identity I D is revoked. Otherwise, it proceeds the following steps: 1) Let d be the index of I D and R I be the revoked index set of R. Note that these are implicitly included in SK and U K respectively. It sets a non-revoked index set S I = N \ R I and derives temporal components T 0 , T 1 and T 2 as
and re-randomizes these components as
2 .
Note that these components are formed as
where r 1 = βr 1 + r 1 and r 2 = α d r 2 + r 2 .
3) Finally, it outputs a decryption key as
RIBE.Encrypt(I D, T, M, P P):
This algorithm takes as input an identity I D, a time T, a message M, and the public parameters P P. It first chooses a random exponent s ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext CT I D,T by implicitly including I D and T as
RIBE.Decrypt(C T I D,T , DK I D ,T , P P): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT I D,T = (C,
, and the public parameters P P.
Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
RIBE.Revoke(I D, T, RL, ST ): This algorithm takes as input an identity I D, a revocation time T, the revocation list RL, and the state ST. If (I D, −) /
∈ ST , then it outputs ⊥ since the private key of I D was not generated. Otherwise, it adds (I D, T ) to RL. It outputs the updated revocation list RL.
B. Correctness
Let SK I D be a private key for an identity I D that is associated with an index d, and U K T ,R be an update key for a time T and a revoked identity set R. If I D / ∈ R, then the decryption key derivation algorithm first correctly derives temporal components as
where R I is the revoked index set of R and S I = N \ R I . Next, a decryption key is correctly derived from the temporal components by performing re-randomization as
Let CT I D,T be a ciphertext for an identity I D and a time T, and DK I D ,T be a decryption key for an identity I D and a time T . If (I D = I D ) ∧ (T = T )
, then the decryption algorithm correctly outputs an encrypted message by the following equation.
C. Security Analysis
To prove the security of our RIBE scheme, we carefully combine the partitioning methods of the PKBE scheme of Boneh et al. [13] and the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [16] .
Theorem 3.1: The above RIBE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if the (3, N)-MDHE assumption holds where N is the maximum number of users in the system. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
I N D-s RL-C P A R I B E,A (λ) ≤
Adv (3,N)-M D H E B (λ).
Proof:
Suppose there exists an adversary A that attacks the above RIBE scheme with a non-negligible advantage.
A simulator B that solves the MDHE assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple or Z = Z 1 ∈ G 3 . Then B that interacts with A is described as follows:
Init: A initially submits a challenge identity I D * , a challenge time T * , and a revoked identity set R * at the time T * . It first sets a state ST and a revocation list RL as empty one.
∈ ST and adds (I D, d) to ST. Let R I * ⊆ N be the revoked index set of R * at the time T * and S I * be the non-revoked index set at the time T * such that S I * = N \ R I * .
Setup:
and publishes the public parameters P P as
,
For notational simplicity, we define Phase 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of private key, update key, and decryption key queries.
If this is a private key query for an identity I D, then B proceeds as follows:
• Case I D ∈ R * : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh et al. [13] . 
1 .
• 
. If this is an update key query for a time T, then B defines a revoked identity set R at the time T from RL and proceeds as follows:
• Case T = T * : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh and Boyen [16] . It first sets a revoked index set R I of R by using ST. It also sets S I = N \ R I . Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and creates an update key U K T ,R by implicitly setting
• Case T = T * : In this case, we have R = R * and the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh et al. [13] . For each I D ∈ R * , it adds (I D, T * ) to RL if (I D, T ) / ∈ RL for any T ≤ T * . Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and creates an update key
If this is a decryption key query for an identity I D and a time T, then B proceeds as follows:
• Case I D = I D * : In this case, the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh and Boyen [16] . 
• Case I D = I D * : In this case, we have T = T * from the restriction of Definition 2.2, and the simulator can use the partitioning method of Boneh and Boyen [16] . It selects random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and creates a decryption key DK I D,T by implicitly setting
Challenge: A submits two challenge messages M * 0 , M * 1 . B chooses a random bit δ ∈ {0, 1} and creates the challenge ciphertext CT * by implicitly setting s = c as
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess δ ∈ {0, 1}. B outputs 0 if δ = δ or 1 otherwise.
To finish the proof, we first show that the distribution of the simulation is correct from Lemma 3.2. Let η be a random bit for Z η . From the above simulation, we have Pr[δ = δ |η = 0] = since δ is completely hidden to A. Therefore we can obtain the following equation
I N D-s RL-C P A R I B E,A (λ).
This completes our proof.
Lemma 3.2:
The distribution of the above simulation is correct if Z = Z 0 , and the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the adversary's view if Z = Z 1 .
Proof: The distribution of public parameters is correct since random exponents
We show that the distribution of private keys is correct. In case of I D ∈ R * , we have that the private key is correctly distributed from the setting γ = θ − j ∈S I * a N+1− j as the following equation
In case of I D / ∈ R * , we have that the private key is correctly distributed from the setting γ = θ − j ∈S I * a N+1− j and r 1 = −a/ I D + r 1 as the following equation
Next, we show that the distribution of update keys is correct. In case of T = T * , we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting γ = θ − j ∈S I * a N+1− j and r 2 = −(− j ∈S I * \S I a N+1− j + j ∈S I \S I * a N+1− j )/ T + r 2 as the following equation
In case of T = T * , we have that the update key is correctly distributed from the setting γ = θ − j ∈S I * a N+1− j as the following equation
We show that the distribution of decryption keys is correct. In case of I D = I D * , the decryption key is correctly distributed from the setting log g 2 F 2 (I D) = α N I D and
In case of I D = I D * , the decryption key is correctly distributed from the setting log g 2 H 2 (T ) = b T and r 2 = (−a/ T + r 2 )a N as the following equation
). Finally, we show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is correct. If Z = Z 0 = g a N+1 bc 3 is given, then the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as the following equation
Otherwise, the component C of the challenge ciphertext is independent of δ in the A's view since Z 1 is a random element in G 3 . This completes our proof.
D. Discussions Graded Encoding Systems:
The candidate multilinear maps of Garg et al. [15] are different from the leveled multilinear maps in Section II-B. The main difference is that the encoding of a group element is randomized in the GGH framework whereas the encoding is deterministic in the leveled multilinear maps. This means that it is not trivial to check whether two strings encode the same element. Thus, additional procedures for this checking are essentially required in the GGH framework. In the full version of this paper [31] , we define the graded encoding system of Garg et al. [15] and translate our RIBE scheme for small universe in that the total number of identities is limited to polynomial number into the graded encoding system.
Asymptotic Analysis: The number of group elements in public parameters, a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext of our RIBE scheme is O (N + λ), O(1), O(1), and O(1) respectively, where N is the maximum number of users. Although our RIBE scheme provides efficient asymptotic parameters, except for the public parameters, it is not actually efficient since the underlying multilinear maps are not yet practically efficient. Let λ = 80 and k = 3. The multilinear maps of Garg et al. [15] have the following asymptotic parameters such that the bit size of the public parameters is O(k 3 λ 5 log(kλ)) ≈ 7.1 * 10 11 and the bit size of group elements is O(k 2 λ 3 ) ≈ 4.6 * 10 6 . To improve the efficiency, we may use the multilinear maps of Langlois et al. [32] such that the bit size of the public parameters is O(k 3 λ log 2 (kλ)) ≈ 1.8 * 10 5 and the bit size of the group elements is O(k 2 λ log 2 (kλ)) ≈ 4.6 * 10 4 . Note that the bit size of the group elements in bilinear groups is 160.
Chosen-Ciphertext Security: Security against chosenciphertext attacks (CCA security) is similar to security against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA security) except that an adversary can request a ciphertext decryption query. To provide CCA security, we can use the general transformation of Canetti et al. [33] since the structure of our RIBE scheme is similar to that of the BB-HIBE scheme [16] . That is, we can modify our RIBE scheme to support three-level hierarchies by providing additional elements, and then the modified RIBE scheme is easily converted to a CCA-secure RIBE scheme since this tree-level HIBE scheme with CPA security is converted to a two-level HIBE scheme with CCA security.
IV. REVOCABLE IBE WITH SHORTER PARAMETERS
In this section, we propose an RIBE scheme with short public parameters and short keys from multilinear maps and prove its selective revocation list security. To achieve shorter size of public parameters, we use the BWZ-PKBE scheme [17] that uses multilinear maps since it has short public parameters and the structure of it is almost similar to that of the BGW-PKBE scheme [13] .
A. Construction
We set N = 2 n −2 for some integer n. Note that N should be polynomial in the security parameter λ. Let N = {1, . . . , N}. Let I = {0, 1} l 1 be the identity space and T = {0, 1} l 2 be the time space where l 1 = 2λ and l 2 = λ. We suppose that an index d that is assigned to an identity I D has a Hamming weight l. Our RIBE scheme from 2n +l −2-leveled multilinear maps is described as follows:
RIBE.Setup (1 λ , N) : This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and the maximum number N of users. It generates a 2n + l − 2-leveled multilinear group G = (G 1 , . . . , G 2n+l−2 ) of prime order p. Let g i be generators of G i respectively. Let P P M L M be the description of the multilinear group with generators.
for a level k ≥ n − 1. Note that we can obtain f k and h k from f n−1 and h n−1 by performing pairing operations. We define
and
is a bit value at the position i and T [i ] is a bit value at the position i . 2) Next, it selects random exponents α, β, γ ∈ Z p .
RIBE.GenKey(I D, M K, ST, P P):
RIBE.UpdateKey(T, RL, M K, ST, P P):
This algorithm takes as input a time T ∈ T , the revocation list RL, the master key M K, the state ST, and public parameters P P. } j ∈S I by performing multiplications and pairing operations on the elements that are given in P P. 3) Next, it selects a random exponent r 2 ∈ Z p and outputs an update key U K T ,R by implicitly including T, R, and the revoked index set R I as
n−1 .
RIBE.DeriveKey(S K I D , U K T ,R , P P):
This algorithm takes as input a private key SK I D = (K 0 , K 1 ) for an identity I D, an update key U K T ,R = (U 0 , U 1 ) for a time T and a revoked set R of identities, and the public parameters P P. If I D ∈ R, then it outputs ⊥ since the identity I D is revoked. Otherwise, it proceeds the following steps:
1) Let d be the index of I D and R I be the revoked index set of R. Note that these are implicitly included in SK and U K respectively. It sets a non-revoked index
} j ∈S I, j =d by performing multiplications and pairing operations on the elements that are given in P P. Using these elements, it derives temporal components T 0 , T 1 and T 2 as
3) Next, it chooses random exponents r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p and re-randomizes these components as
RIBE.Encrypt(I D, T, M, P P):
This algorithm takes as input an identity I D, a time T, a message M, and the public parameters P P. It chooses a random exponent s ∈ Z p and outputs a ciphertext CT I D,T by implicitly including I D and T as 
RIBE.Decrypt(C T I D,T , DK I D ,T , P P): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext
CT I D,T = (C, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ), a decryption key DK I D ,T = (D 0 , D 1 , D 2 ),
B. Correctness
We first show that some elements that are needed for the scheme can be easily computed from the elements in P P. We use the following claim of Boneh, Waters, and Zhandry.
Claim [17] : Using group multiplications and pairing operations on the g
of weight exactly l, and g
The correctness of decryption keys and the decryption algorithm is almost similar to that of Section III. We omit this since the lack of space.
C. Security Analysis
The proof of security is almost similar to that in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.1: The above RIBE scheme is secure in the selective revocation list model under chosen plaintext attacks if the (k, n, l)-cMDHE assumption holds where N = 2 n − 2 is the maximum number of users and k = 2n +l − 2. That is, for any PPT adversary A, we have that Adv
Note that it can computes H l (T ) since g b l is given in the assumption.
To finish the proof, we should show that the distribution of the simulation is correct. We omit the analysis of the distribution since the analysis is almost similar to that of Lemma 3.2 except that it uses multilinear maps and the Claim IV-B. This completes our proof.
D. Discussions
Asymptotic Analysis: The number of group elements in public parameters, a private key, an update key, and a ciphertext of our second RIBE scheme is O(log N +λ), O(1), O (1) , and O(1) respectively, where N is the maximum number of users. However, our RIBE scheme requires k-leveled multilinear maps where k ≈ 2.5 log N since the BWZ-PKBE scheme requires 1.5 log N-leveled multilinear maps [17] . If we use the improved multilinear maps of Langlois et al. [32] , the bit size of the group elements in k-leveled multilinear maps is O(k 2 λ log 2 (kλ)). Let λ = 80 and N = 2 20 . The bit size of the group elements in 2.5 log N-leveled multilinear maps is approximately 2.4 * 10 5 . In the BGK-RIBE scheme [7] , the bit size of a private key and an update key is approximately 3.2 * 10 2 and 1.6 * 10 6 respectively, where the number of revoked users is r = 2 10 . Therefore, our second RIBE scheme equipped with the currently best leveled multilinear maps [32] does not provide better parameters except the bit size of update keys. However, we expect that the parameters of leveled multilinear maps will be improved in the near future.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we devised a new technique for RIBE that uses multilinear maps to combine an IBE scheme with a PKBE scheme. Following our technique, we first proposed an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements by combining the HIBE scheme of Boneh and Boyen [16] and the BGW-PKBE scheme [13] , and then we proved its security in the selective revocation list model. Next, we proposed another RIBE scheme that reduces the number of public parameters from O(N + λ) to O(log N + λ) group elements by using the BWZ-PKBE scheme [17] , which has short public parameters. We expect that our technique will open a new direction to build an efficient RIBE scheme and its extensions.
There are many interesting unsolved problems in RIBE. The first one is to construct an RIBE scheme with short parameters and short keys that is secure in the adaptive security model instead of in the selective revocation list model. The second one is to construct a revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme with better parameters. RHIBE provides the private key delegation functionality and the revocation functionality for each user. The RHIBE scheme of Seo and Emura [11] has O(l 2 log N) number of private key elements and O(r log(N/r )) number of update key elements where l is the depth of hierarchy, N is the maximum number of users, and r is the maximum number of revoked users. The third one is to build an RIBE scheme with a constant number of private key elements and update key elements that can handle the exponential number of users in the system. Recall that our second RIBE scheme cannot handle the exponential number of users since the size of receiver set in the BWZ-PKBE scheme is restricted to being polynomial.
APPENDIX A SECURITY IN GENERIC MULTILINEAR GROUPS
In this section, we introduce the definition of generic multilinear groups and discuss the difficulty of our new assumptions in generic multilinear groups.
A. Generic Multilinear Groups
We define the generic multilinear groups by following the generic group model [34] , [35] . Let k be the target integer. Let ξ : Z p × Z → {0, 1} m be a random injective encoding that maps elements of the additive group Z p and an integer Z into strings of length m. We define the groups G i = {ξ(x, i )|x ∈ Z p }. We are given oracles to compute the multiplication and pairing operations. That is, an algorithm in the generic multilinear groups is given the following oracles:
Encode ( 
B. Analysis of New Assumptions
The master theorem of Boneh et al. [35] is widely used to prove the difficulty of an assumption in generic bilinear groups. It is relatively straightforward to extend the master theorem of Boneh et al. in generic multilinear groups as pointed by Boneh et al. [17] . The master theorem informally states that if the target polynomial is independent of given polynomials in the assumption, then the advantage of an adversary in generic groups is bounded by q 2 d/ p, where q is the maximum number of queries, d is the maximum degree of polynomials that the adversary can obtain by performing pairing operations, and p is in Z p .
In the (k, N)-MDHE assumption, the target polynomial f is a N+1 k−1 i=1 c i where a and c i are variables. We need two polynomial multiplications (pairings) to obtain a N+1 since a N+1 is not directly given in the assumption, and we need k−1 polynomial multiplications to obtain k−1 i=1 c i . Thus, we need k + 1 polynomial multiplications (pairings) to obtain the target polynomial, but this is not allowed in the k-leveled multilinear maps. Therefore, the target polynomial is independent of given polynomials. We have the degree of polynomials d = O(k N) since the adversary can obtain elements with high-degree a kN by performing pairing operations. For λ-bit security, we can set p ≈ 2 λ since N is a polynomial value in a security parameter.
The difficulty of the assumption of Boneh et al. [17] is already given in generic multilinear groups. We can also follow their analysis since our cMDHE assumption is a slight modification of their assumption. In the (k, n, l)-cMDHE assumption, the target polynomial f is a 2 n −1 bc where a, b, and c are variables. We need n polynomial multiplications (pairings) to obtain a 2 n −1 since {a 2 i } i∈ [0,n] are only given in the assumption. Thus the target polynomial a 2 n −1 bc should reside in 2n +l − 1-level since b is a polynomial in the l-level and c is a polynomial in the n − 1-level, but this is not allowed in the 2n + l − 2-leveled multilinear maps. Therefore, the target polynomial is independent of given polynomials. We have d = O(n2 n ) since the assumption includes elements with high degree a 2 n . For λ-bit security, we can set p ≈ 2 3λ instead of p ≈ 2 λ .
